CVE-2026-31578

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: as102: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in as102_usb_probe()

In as102_usb driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
		CPU0						CPU1
as102_usb_probe()
  kzalloc(); // alloc as102_dev_t
  ....
  usb_register_dev();
						fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open as102 fd
						....
  usb_deregister_dev();
  ....
  kfree(); // free as102_dev_t
  ....
						sys_close(fd);
						  as102_release() // UAF!!
						    as102_usb_release()
						      kfree(); // DFB!!
```

When a USB character device registered with usb_register_dev() is later
unregistered (via usb_deregister_dev() or disconnect), the device node is
removed so new open() calls fail. However, file descriptors that are
already open do not go away immediately: they remain valid until the last
reference is dropped and the driver's .release() is invoked.

In as102, as102_usb_probe() calls usb_register_dev() and then, on an
error path, does usb_deregister_dev() and frees as102_dev_t right away.
If userspace raced a successful open() before the deregistration, that
open FD will later hit as102_release() --> as102_usb_release() and access
or free as102_dev_t again, occur a race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln.

The fix is to never kfree(as102_dev_t) directly once usb_register_dev()
has succeeded. After deregistration, defer freeing memory to .release().

In other words, let release() perform the last kfree when the final open
FD is closed.