CVE-2024-49949

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO

After commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso
requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check
to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet.

Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count
transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space
to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic :

IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28.

When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up
with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len

Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 :

gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
                        shinfo->gso_size);

Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/

qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len;

This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1]

qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation
of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel.

This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one
adds more sanity checks for another potential bug.

[1]
[   70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0
[   70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991
[   70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel
[ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49
All code
========
   0:	24 08                	and    $0x8,%al
   2:	49 c1 e1 06          	shl    $0x6,%r9
   6:	44 89 7c 24 18       	mov    %r15d,0x18(%rsp)
   b:	45 31 ed             	xor    %r13d,%r13d
   e:	45 31 c0             	xor    %r8d,%r8d
  11:	31 ff                	xor    %edi,%edi
  13:	89 44 24 14          	mov    %eax,0x14(%rsp)
  17:	4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 	add    0x190(%rbx),%r9
  1e:	eb 04                	jmp    0x24
  20:	39 ca                	cmp    %ecx,%edx
  22:	73 37                	jae    0x5b
  24:	4d 8b 39             	mov    (%r9),%r15
  27:	83 c7 01             	add    $0x1,%edi
  2a:*	49 8b 17             	mov    (%r15),%rdx		<-- trapping instruction
  2d:	49 89 11             	mov    %rdx,(%r9)
  30:	41 8b 57 28          	mov    0x28(%r15),%edx
  34:	45 8b 5f 34          	mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d
  38:	49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,(%r15)
  3f:	49                   	rex.WB

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
   0:	49 8b 17             	mov    (%r15),%rdx
   3:	49 89 11             	mov    %rdx,(%r9)
   6:	41 8b 57 28          	mov    0x28(%r15),%edx
   a:	45 8b 5f 34          	mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d
   e:	49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,(%r15)
  15:	49                   	rex.WB
[   70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202
[   70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
[   70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000
[   70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58
[   70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] FS:  000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   70.724561] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 C
---truncated---