CVE-2026-80832

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation

The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen()
can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA
scatterlist.

The allocation size is currently calculated as:

  ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN

while the DMA length is set to:

  ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16)

Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation
can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when
assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2:

  allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38
  DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48

As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated
buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data.
The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag,
resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test
failures such as:

  alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result)
  on test vector 8

Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header
length before alignment:

  ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16)

This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough
for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.