CVE-2026-74576

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/slab: prevent unbounded recursion in free path with new kmalloc type

Commit 280ea9c3154b ("mm/slab: avoid allocating slabobj_ext array from
its own slab") avoided recursive allocation of obj_exts from kmalloc
caches of the same size, by bumping the obj_exts array's allocation
size whenever the array size equals the size of the object being
allocated.

However, as reported by Danielle Costantino and Shakeel Butt,
even slabs from kmalloc caches of different sizes can form a cycle
by allocating obj_exts arrays from each other [1]:

  What happened: a KMALLOC_NORMAL slab's obj_exts array (used by
  allocation profiling / memcg accounting) is itself kmalloc()'d from a
  KMALLOC_NORMAL cache, so the "slab holds another slab's obj_exts array"
  relation can form cycles. With sizeof(struct slabobj_ext) == 16 and
  the host's geometry:

  - kmalloc-512 has 64 objects/slab -> array is 64*16 == 1024 bytes,
    served from kmalloc-1k;
  - kmalloc-1k  has 32 objects/slab -> array is 32*16 ==  512 bytes,
    served from kmalloc-512.

  A kmalloc-512 slab and a kmalloc-1k slab therefore hold each other's
  obj_exts array.  Discarding one frees the other's array, which empties
  and discards that slab, which frees the first's array, and so on:
  __free_slab() -> free_slab_obj_exts() -> kfree() -> discard_slab() ->
  __free_slab() recurses along the cycle until the stack is exhausted.

With memory allocation profiling, this allows unbounded recursion
in the free path and led to a stack overflow on a production host in
the Meta fleet [1]:

  BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit
  Oops: stack guard page
  RIP: 0010:kfree+0x8/0x5d0
  Call Trace:
   __free_slab+0x66/0xc0
   kfree+0x3f0/0x5d0
   ... ( ~125x __free_slab <-> kfree ) ...
   <kernel driver freeing a resource>
   do_syscall_64

It is proposed [1] to resolve this issue by always serving the obj_exts
array allocation from kmalloc caches (or large kmalloc) of sizes larger
than the object size. However, as pointed out by Vlastimil Babka [2],
this can waste an excessive amount of memory as slabs from large
kmalloc sizes (e.g. kmalloc-8k) generally need obj_exts arrays much
smaller than the object size.

Therefore, rather than bumping the size, let us take a different
approach; disallow formation of cycles between kmalloc types when
allocating obj_exts arrays. Currently, all obj_exts arrays are served
from normal kmalloc caches. Cycles cannot be created if obj_exts arrays
of normal kmalloc caches are served from a special kmalloc type that can
never have obj_exts arrays.

To achieve this, create a new kmalloc type called KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT.
KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT caches are created with SLAB_NO_OBJ_EXT flag when
either 1) memory allocation profiling is not permanently disabled,
or 2) kmalloc types with a priority higher than KMALLOC_CGROUP are
aliased with KMALLOC_NORMAL.

Sheaf bootstrapping for KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT caches now must be deferred
because allocation of a barn can trigger obj_exts array allocation of
normal kmalloc caches when the KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT cache for that size
is not ready yet. For simplicity, perform bootstrapping of sheaves for
all kmalloc caches later.

Introduce a new slab alloc flag, SLAB_ALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT, to prevent
allocation of obj_exts arrays, and let kmalloc_slab() override the type
to KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT when specified. Note that kmalloc_type() remains
unchanged because kmalloc_flags() bypasses the kmalloc fastpath.

Do not pass SLAB_ALLOC_NO_RECURSE to kmalloc_flags() in
alloc_slab_obj_exts() and instead use SLAB_ALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT only when
the objects are allocated from normal kmalloc caches. While this
prevents unbounded recursive allocation of obj_exts, it allows
KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT caches to have sheaves.

Since sheaf allocations specify SLAB_ALLOC_NO_RECURSE that prevents
allocation of both sheaves and obj_exts arrays, the recursion depth
is bounded.

obj_exts arrays for non-
---truncated---