CVE-2026-72367

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow

iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes
changed ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data
within EOF.  This trims io_size when a writeback range extends
past end_pos:

    ioend->io_size += map_len;
    if (ioend->io_offset + ioend->io_size > end_pos)
        ioend->io_size = end_pos - ioend->io_offset;

However, if end_pos ends up below ioend->io_offset, the subtraction
becomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned
wrap to a huge value.  This can happen when writeback continues past
byte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent
truncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in
iomap_writeback_handle_eof().

A wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt
completion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume
io_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW
completion ranges.

Fix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before
the ioend start offset.  This preserves the original intent of trimming
io_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow.