CVE-2026-64523

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit

handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that.  sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.

Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.

The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path.  Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use.  When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.

The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch.