CVE-2026-63815

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes

When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads
the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally:

	if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi))
		fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size);

but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the
FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set.  An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline
data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline
directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled
i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image.

get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it
feeds the inode geometry:

	MAX_INLINE_DATA()  = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1)
	NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...)
	addrs_per_page()   = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size

A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY()
negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative
value.  The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos
against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound,
and reads far past the inline area:

	while (bit_pos < d->max)		/* fs/f2fs/dir.c */
		... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ...

Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an
out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also
corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files.

Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the
flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is
loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE
bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate
inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted.