Jerryscript ≫ Jerryscript

There is an Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' failed at js-parser-expr.c:3230 in parser_parse_object_initializer in JerryScript 2.2.0.

There is an Assertion 'context.status_flags & PARSER_SCANNING_SUCCESSFUL' failed at js-parser.c:2185 in parser_parse_source in JerryScript 2.2.0.

There is an Assertion 'context_p->stack_depth == context_p->context_stack_depth' failed at js-parser-statm.c:2756 in parser_parse_statements in JerryScript 2.2.0.

In JerryScript 2.3.0, there is an out-of-bounds read in main_print_unhandled_exception in the main-utils.c file.

vm/opcodes.c in JerryScript 2.2.0 allows attackers to hijack the flow of control by controlling a register.

JerryScript through 2.3.0 allows stack consumption via function a(){new new Proxy(a,{})}JSON.parse("[]",a). NOTE: the vendor states that the problem is the lack of the --stack-limit option

JerryScript through 2.3.0 has a (function({a=arguments}){const arguments}) buffer over-read.

An issue was discovered in ecma/operations/ecma-container-object.c in JerryScript 2.2.0. Operations with key/value pairs did not consider the case where garbage collection is triggered after the key operation but before the value operation, as demons...

parser/js/js-scanner.c in JerryScript 2.2.0 mishandles errors during certain out-of-memory conditions, as demonstrated by a scanner_reverse_info_list NULL pointer dereference and a scanner_scan_all assertion failure.

JerryScript 2.2.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption) via a proxy operation.