Gnupg ≫ Gnupg

CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) parsing in gpgsm in GnuPG through 2.5.20 mishandles the CMS format for AES-GCM because aes-ICVlen is supposed to be 12 bytes but 4 bytes is accepted. NOTE: this is related to CVE-2026-34182.

In GnuPG before 2.5.17, a long signature packet length causes parse_signature to return success with sig->data[] set to a NULL value, leading to a denial of service (application crash).

In GnuPG before 2.5.17, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in tpm2daemon during handling of the PKDECRYPT command for TPM-backed RSA and ECC keys.

In GnuPG before 2.5.17, a crafted CMS (S/MIME) EnvelopedData message carrying an oversized wrapped session key can cause a stack-based buffer overflow in gpg-agent during PKDECRYPT--kem=CMS handling. This can easily be leveraged for denial of service...

In GnuPG before 2.4.9, armor_filter in g10/armor.c has two increments of an index variable where one is intended, leading to an out-of-bounds write for crafted input. (For ExtendedLTS, 2.2.51 and later are fixed versions.)

In GnuPG through 2.4.8, if a signed message has \f at the end of a plaintext line, an adversary can construct a modified message that places additional text after the signed material, such that signature verification of the modified message succeeds ...

In GnuPG before 2.5.5, if a user chooses to import a certificate with certain crafted subkey data that lacks a valid backsig or that has incorrect usage flags, the user loses the ability to verify signatures made from certain other signing keys, aka ...

GnuPG can be made to spin on a relatively small input by (for example) crafting a public key with thousands of signatures attached, compressed down to just a few KB.

A vulnerability was found in the Libksba library due to an integer overflow within the CRL parser. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely for code execution on the target system by passing specially crafted data to the application, for example, ...

GnuPG through 2.3.6, in unusual situations where an attacker possesses any secret-key information from a victim's keyring and other constraints (e.g., use of GPGME) are met, allows signature forgery via injection into the status line.