Mintplexlabs ≫ Anythingllm

mintplex-labs/anything-llm is vulnerable to a relative path traversal attack, allowing unauthorized attackers with a default role account to delete files and folders within the filesystem, including critical database files such as 'anythingllm.db'. T...

A mass assignment vulnerability exists in the `/api/invite/:code` endpoint of the mintplex-labs/anything-llm repository, allowing unauthorized creation of high-privileged accounts. By intercepting and modifying the HTTP request during the account cre...

A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the chat functionality of the mintplex-labs/anything-llm repository, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a user's session. By manipulating the ChatBot respon...

A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm repository when the application is running in 'just me' mode with a password. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by making a request to the endpoint using the [v...

A vulnerability in mintplex-labs/anything-llm allows users with manager roles to escalate their privileges to admin roles through a mass assignment issue. The '/admin/system-preferences' API endpoint improperly authorizes manager-level users to modif...

In mintplex-labs/anything-llm, an improper input validation vulnerability allows attackers to escalate privileges by deactivating 'Multi-User Mode'. By sending a specially crafted curl request with the 'multi_user_mode' parameter set to false, an att...

mintplex-labs/anything-llm is vulnerable to path traversal attacks due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the logo filename functionality. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the logo filename to reference files...

As a default user on a multi-user instance of AnythingLLM, you could execute a call to the `/export-data` endpoint of the system and then unzip and read that export that would enable you do exfiltrate data of the system at that save state. This woul...

If an attacked was given access to an instance with the admin or manager role there is no backend authentication that would prevent the attacked from creating a new user with an `admin` role and then be able to use this new account to have elevated p...

A user who is privileged already `manager` or `admin` can set their profile picture via the frontend API using a relative filepath to then user the PFP GET API to download any valid files. The attacker would have to have been granted privileged perm...