-
CVE-2026-43472
- EPSS 0.03%
- Veröffentlicht 08.05.2026 14:22:31
- Zuletzt bearbeitet 12.05.2026 14:10:27
- Quelle 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081f
- CVE-Watchlists
- Unerledigt
unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a
CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that
case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy,
which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]
> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.
Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness.
Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS
(and current->fs->users == 1).
We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and
flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace.
Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM).
We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's
destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and
current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.
They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling
process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with
pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.
There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including
the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one
is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new
fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could
go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might
end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set,
force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost
of copy_fs_struct() is trivial.
Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets
a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That
seriously simplifies the analysis...
FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/Daten sind bereitgestellt durch das CVE Programm von einer CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) (Unstrukturiert).
HerstellerLinux
≫
Produkt
Linux
Default Statusunaffected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
845bf3c6963a52096d0d3866e4a92db77a0c03d8
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
d3ffc8f13034af895531a02c30b1fe3a34b46432
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
d0d99f60538ddb4a62ccaac2168d8f448965f083
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
d7963d6997fea86a6def242ac36198b86655f912
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
aa9ebc084505fb26dd90f4d7a249045aad152043
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
af8f4be3b68ac8caa41c8e5ead0eeaf5e85e42d0
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
42e21e74061b0ebbd859839f81acf10efad02a27
Status
affected
Version
741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f
Version <
6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9f
Status
affected
HerstellerLinux
≫
Produkt
Linux
Default Statusaffected
Version
2.6.16
Status
affected
Version
0
Version <
2.6.16
Status
unaffected
Version <=
5.10.*
Version
5.10.253
Status
unaffected
Version <=
5.15.*
Version
5.15.203
Status
unaffected
Version <=
6.1.*
Version
6.1.167
Status
unaffected
Version <=
6.6.*
Version
6.6.130
Status
unaffected
Version <=
6.12.*
Version
6.12.78
Status
unaffected
Version <=
6.18.*
Version
6.18.19
Status
unaffected
Version <=
6.19.*
Version
6.19.9
Status
unaffected
Version <=
*
Version
7.0
Status
unaffected
VulnDex Vulnerability Enrichment
| Typ | Quelle | Score | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPSS | FIRST.org | 0.03% | 0.094 |
| Quelle | Base Score | Exploit Score | Impact Score | Vector String |
|---|